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Abstract
No company is immune to crisis situations, an affirmation which, despite its 
triviality, is undeniably true. However, from the early 2014, such statement may 
have become even more true to Russian corporations, as the annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula gave start to rounds of economic sanctions that are still per-
petrated today. Such measures, which were initiated in response to the Kremlin’s 
political maneuvers, have hit a number of Russian companies, and increased the 
degree of uncertainty in which they have to operate, as they see economic restric-
tion’s impact not only on the business activity tangible factors—i.e., economic 
rewards, service, and performance—but also on intangible factors—i.e., image and 
reputation—as well. Crises are integral parts of all world systems, unfortunately. 
While they are a theoretically well-understood issue, in practice, crises are per-
ceived as a very painful phenomenon. A crisis can be compared to riding a roller 
coaster. First, as we gain speed and climb up the tracks we are filled with a sense of 
joy and delight. These feelings are quickly replaced with anticipation, panic, and 
fear as the roller coaster plunges into the “abyss.”
Keywords: crisis management, crisis, communication strategies, RUSAL, risk 
management
1. Introduction
Crises are integral parts of all world systems, unfortunately. While they are 
a theoretically well-understood issue, in practice, crises are perceived as a very 
painful phenomenon. A crisis can be compared to riding a roller coaster. First, as 
we gain speed and climb up the tracks we are filled with a sense of joy and delight. 
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These feelings are quickly replaced with anticipation, panic, and fear as the roller 
coaster plunges into the “abyss.”
Given the likeliness of finding itself in the midst of crises resulting from the 
geopolitical crossfire between Russia and the U.S., some guidelines in the form 
of a strategy are needed, and the paper will aim at providing them. It should be 
made clear, though, that the strategy does not seek to attain this purpose only, as it 
also intends to formulate a set of directives to mitigate negative repercussions for 
the corporate reputation within unstable geopolitical conditions. More precisely, 
by taking into exam the case study of RUSAL—a leader in the Russian metal and 
mining industry, which after being put on the U.S. Congress blacklist on the base of 
presumed closeness to the Russian government last April has recently obtained to 
have sanctions against it terminated—a communications strategy that could serve 
companies to ease the sanctions-lifting process will be outlined.
A crisis is something that can stimulate an almost infinite number of associa-
tions in one’s mind. Due to the extremely various scope of actions that this word 
may include—from natural catastrophes to personal problems—it is extremely hard 
to find a definition which can perfectly fit any critical occurrence. As has already 
been established, the research will deal with crises at the international political 
level, e.g., geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and Russia, which have led to 
crises at the business level, e.g., sanctions and blacklisting of Russian companies. 
Even if the idea of crisis is narrowed down to these two specific contexts, it may still 
be hard to find a generally accepted definition, although some consistency among 
all the diverse descriptions might be observed. In the field of international politics, 
Coombs [1] affirmed that there is no commonly accepted idea of international 
crisis, as a crisis is usually defined by and in the terms of the involved parties. For 
example, Tucker and Melewar [2] described the Cuban Missile Crisis during the 
Cold War by mentioning some elements necessary to understand the nature of such 
crisis, including the perception of high threat to important values and objectives, 
the feeling of being caught unaware, and having short time to respond.
These elements were seen by the American decision-makers as the reasons to 
classify the Cuban Missile situation as crisis. Conversely, according to other schol-
ars, an international crisis is any situation in which there is some significant change 
in the normal interaction patterns between nations [3].
More precisely, as explained by Young, an international crisis consists of “a set of 
rapidly unfolding events which raises the impact of destabilizing forces in the gen-
eral system substantially above ‘normal’ (i.e., average) levels and increases the like-
lihood of violence occurring in the system”[3]. Thus, at least as far as international 
politics is concerned, the definition of a crisis closely depends upon the approach 
which is used to analyze a situation. If, on the one hand, a crisis can be defined 
by the definitional approach focusing on the decision-making perspective, on the 
other, it can be defined by the way decisions taken by nations that have an impact on 
the system and the ordinary flow of politics. Defining a crisis in corporate context 
is equally difficult. As a matter of fact, despite increasing scientific interest in the 
issue and the importance that crisis management functions are recognized, there is 
still no generally accepted terminology for organizational crises. Based on a sample 
of 20 in-depth interviews conducted in 2014 with senior crisis communicators 
about organizational crisis recovery, crises were largely defined as “events which 
have the potential to negatively impact organizations’ operations”[1]. Well before, 
O’Rourke [2] had claimed that although such bad events may be all unique, they 
do share some common characteristics. These characteristics include an element 
of surprise, which can make crisis management even more difficult, insufficient 
information, which makes it hard for a company to explain all the questions it is 
usually asked right away. In addition, the quick pace of events and the fact that the 
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situation can go south very rapidly are reflected by the intense scrutiny and media 
attention to which the whole matter is normally accompanied with.
Similar to O’Rourke’s view is the one of Coombs [1] for which a crisis is a threat 
that can potentially damage an organization and its stakeholders in three regards—
public safety, financial loss, and reputation loss. In particular, a crisis represents a 
threat to corporate reputation because it gives people reasons to think badly of the 
organization. Alongside many of the accusations raised by OFAC against Russia 
were not proved to be true and the motives behind sanctions also came into ques-
tion, a crisis here could trace the idea of scandal which, according to Davis [2], 
derives from extensively publicized allegations that damage or attempt to damage 
the reputation of another party. A scandal can lead to stakeholders having more 
distrust for the party involved, which is likely to come out of the situation with a 
damaged reputation. Many other definitions and synonyms for the term “crisis” 
exist. However, it is the idea conceptualized by Coombs [1], the one that will be 
referred to in the course of the paper. Such choice was dictated both by the fact that 
further theories of his will be cited later on in the work, and also by the fact that in 
his definitions he stressed the potential impact of crises on corporate reputation.
As previously mentioned, crises can affect a company’s tangible and intangible 
assets. Therefore, it is logical that crisis management is among the most important 
management functions. In fact, due to the inevitability of a crisis developing, crisis 
preparation may be a critical determinant of survival for any organization. Thus, 
strategic crisis preparation is becoming increasingly important as companies try to 
cope effectively with potential crises [1]. Once again, as for the concepts of corpo-
rate reputation and crisis, there are many definitions to crisis management. The 
first ground of debate comes with the differentiation between crisis management 
and risk management, which both deal with threats that impact the well running 
of the organization’s systems and the well-being of its individuals [3]. Despite often 
being mistakenly thought to be the same, crisis management and risk management 
are two distinguished parts of the general domain of organizational management. 
Crisis management deals with critical situations mostly from a reactive perspec-
tive—e.g., it tries to limit the negative effects of an event by putting certain actions 
in place.
Risk management approaches threats proactively as it is concerned with iden-
tifying and correctly assessing a possible threat. Also, while risk management is 
treating risks individually, crisis management tries to identify the possible con-
nections between different individual threats. Risk management consists of three 
different actions: the identification of risks, the evaluation of risks, and mitigation. 
Given the proactivity that characterizes it and the fact that it assesses threats before 
they actually materialize, risk management can also be referred to as crisis preven-
tion, as it aims to create a reference framework that will allow companies to handle 
risk and uncertainty [2]. If implemented within a company as a continuous process, 
crisis prevention or risk management will considerably diminish the probability 
for the organization to face a crisis. The three actions of crisis prevention are just 
components to the larger crisis management process, which deals with crises before, 
during, and after they have occurred. Therefore, the concepts of risk management 
and crisis management do not overlap, rather, they are two different organizational 
practices that aim at increasing the capacity of a company to cope in the most 
efficient way with any crisis that arises, which might put in danger its functionality 
or even existence. Having clarified this point, some definitions of crisis manage-
ment will be discussed further. Coombs [1] intended crisis management as a process 
designed to prevent or lessen the damage that a crisis can inflict on an organization 
and its stakeholders. As hinted earlier, such process can be divided into precrisis, 
crisis response, and postcrisis phases. In order to be effective, crisis management 
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needs to handle the threats in a sequential way. Some additional criteria to assess the 
effectiveness of such process were suggested by Pearson and Clair [2].
Essentially, given the variety of negative effects crises are usually accompanied 
by, to judge as effective all the efforts of a company aimed at pulling it out of a crisis 
would be inappropriate; likewise, the simple survival of the company may not be 
enough of an indicator of the effectiveness rather ineffectiveness of such efforts and 
of the crisis management process in general. However, it is possible to define crisis 
management as effective when operations are sustained or resumed, and internal 
and external stakeholders’ losses are minimized, and learning occurs so that lessons 
are transferred to future incidents [4]. More precisely, crisis management was 
viewed by Pearson and Clair as a “systematic attempt by organizational members 
with external stakeholders to avert crises or to effectively manage those that do 
occur”[3], whose effectiveness is evidenced when “potential crises are averted or 
when key stakeholders believe that the success outcomes of short and long-range 
impacts of crises outweigh the failure outcomes”[1]. Apart from the issues that arise 
when considering the definition, the complexity of the concept is also reflected 
by the number of crisis management models in the existing literature. Given the 
fact that the quantity of information in the volumes on crisis management can be 
overwhelming, only the three crisis management models that have been indicated 
by Coombs [1] to be the most influential—the three-stage model, Fink’s four-stage 
model [2], and Mitroff ’s five-stage model [5]—will be overviewed. Among the first 
crisis management models is the three-stage one, which is attributed to no par-
ticular scholar. Such model is characterized by three stages—precrisis, crisis, and 
postcrisis. The precrisis stage deals with all the proactive aspects of crisis preven-
tion; the crisis stage refers to the measures taken in response to the occurrence of 
the crisis event; and the postcrisis mostly about ensuring that the crisis is over, and 
learning from the event. Similar to the three-stage model is the model proposed by 
Fink [2]. Essentially, S. Fink compared the crisis to a life cycle, which can be divided 
into four different stages: the prodromal stage, the acute stage, the chronic stage, 
and the resolution stage.
The prodromal stage—the denomination comes from the Greek term “pro-
drome” which means “running before”—can be traced back to the three-stage 
model precrisis stage, during which the professionals need to adopt a proactive 
approach in order to detect the signals of an impending crisis. Then, following 
a trigger event, the acute stage initiates and the actual crisis begins. This stage 
is characterized by the crisis event and the resulting damage. The severity and 
damage can depend upon the prevention activities carried out during the pro-
dromal stage. The third phase is labeled as chronic stage, as here the main crisis 
occurrence might have been managed. However, the lasting effects of the incident 
might extend the duration of the life cycle and make the shift toward the resolution 
stage—which is identified with the clear end to the crisis—more difficult. Some 
of the elements firstly introduced by the three-stage model and then readapted by 
Fink have also been shared by Mitroff ’s [5] five-stage crisis management model, 
which includes signal detection, probing and prevention, damage containment, 
recovery, and learning. The first two stages include all the proactive steps that 
an organization can take prior to a crisis event. As signal detection consists of 
identifying the signs of possible crises, it is much like Fink’s prodromal stage; 
probing and prevention, instead, constitute a new phase in which known crises are 
observed and researched in order to determine ways to prevent them from happen-
ing. The last three phases of Mitroff ’s model vary just in a minor extent from Fink’s 
acute, chronic, and resolution stages. As a matter of fact, they are all devoted to the 
containment of the crisis and to the operations that should be undertaken to facili-
tate the return to the precrisis status quo. The slight differences between the two 
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authors arise from the way in which they have structured their models. As it was 
mentioned before, Mitroff ’s model [5] is cyclical, unlikely from Fink’s. Thus, the 
learning stage allows an organization to integrate what it has learned from the crisis 
into its organizational philosophy, and to further apply it in the future. The model 
by Fink simply states that resolution occurs when the crisis is no longer a concern 
and does not bring any mention for what concerns future applications. Although 
disregarded by Fink, the idea that organizations can and should learn from cri-
sis—because otherwise they would be susceptible to similar critical events—was 
acknowledged by the three-stage model as well. As the idea that companies should 
consider crises and other activities from the past will return in a number of pas-
sages later in the composition, which happens to be divided into three parts itself, 
the paper could also be referred to as a three-stage crisis management model. 
Further clarifications will be made throughout the paper.
2. RUSAL’s case
As RUSAL obtained to be delisted from the U.S. Treasury OFAC sanctions list 
on January 27, 2019 [6], after being put under economic restrictions less than 1 year 
before, on April 6, 2018 [7], it was thought that Deripaska’s former company might 
have had some strategy, or at the least some guidelines to resort to in case of sanc-
tions imposition. Subsequently, a more in-depth analysis of the whole sanctions 
on RUSAL affair was carried out by the process of deductive reasoning. Deductive 
reasoning—as opposed to inductive reasoning—can be defined as the process for 
which the truth of the input propositions—or premises—logically guarantees the 
truth of the output proposition—or conclusion [6]. Such premises may be proposi-
tions that the reasoner believes, or assumptions that the reasoner is simply explor-
ing. An example of deductive reasoning is displayed in the following: premise 1: 
every football player must wear a helmet while playing in a football game; premise 
2: Joseph is a football player; conclusion: as Joseph is a football player, then he must 
be wearing a football helmet while playing in a football game. Before applying 
deductive reasoning to the RUSAL case, it should be reminded that a strategy is a 
method or a plan intended to bring about a desired future, such as the achievement 
of a goal, or solution to a problem [7]. In case of RUSAL, the possible solution could 
be connected with the plan to ease the sanctions-lifting process, given the fact that 
the company was freed from U.S. economic restrictions within a rather short period 
of time [8, 9].
Here, deductive reasoning might be applied as follows:
• premise 1: RUSAL had sanctions against it lifted in a short period of time;
• premise 2: a strategy serves to solve a problem, and sanctions are such; and
• conclusion: therefore, RUSAL must have resorted to a strategy.
To ascertain whether a strategy was actually used, a content analysis of press 
releases and media articles coming from the involved parties and a number of 
diverse media sources and newswire agencies was conducted. Another aim of the 
analysis was to seek to identify the strategical measures that RUSAL had employed, 
so that they could be implemented in the overall aim of the research—to provide 
a global communications strategy for companies operating under economic sanc-
tions, or in the context of adverse geopolitical situation at the state level. In terms 
of time, contents taken into account span from sanctions imposition—April 6, 
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2018—to sanctions lifting—January 27, 2019—except for a few pieces of news dat-
ing back to March 2019. In terms of sources, when it comes to the involved parties, 
En+ Group, RUSAL, and the U.S. Treasury press releases were mainly considered; 
when it comes to the media, instead, news from a number of different countries—
e.g., France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, and the United States—and 
different news organizations—e.g., Bloomberg, CNN, Financial Times, NY Times, 
Reuters, Wall Street Journal, and others—were considered and will be mentioned 
along the composition in order to get a perspective on the matter as global as pos-
sible. The content analysis first proceeded with the pieces of news from the media, 
not just because it was easier to retrieve them, but also because they could give a 
broader first glimpse of the situation and the communications practices possibly 
used; after, given the vagueness characterizing some articles and the fact that their 
veracity could not anyhow be verified, the statements from the more “official” 
sources—what was labeled above as “involved parties”—were taken into account. If, 
on the one hand, the first two sections were selected and made part of the disserta-
tion right on the basis of the content analysis of such materials, on the other hand, 
the third and last section on CSR was included not following the examination of the 
case of RUSAL.
Even though as proved by press releases on the company [6] and Deripaska’s 
official websites that RUSAL itself has been engaged in CSR initiatives, the inclusion 
of such section came more in light of the consideration of the Global Transparency 
Initiative (GTI) [2] campaign launched by Kaspersky Lab after the alleged accusa-
tions of working for Russian intelligence services in 2017. As a matter of fact, despite 
not having been put under economic restrictions, Kaspersky—in a similar way to 
RUSAL—suffered due to geopolitical contrasts between Russia and the U.S, as it was 
imposed a ban and saw operations within foreign markets compromised because 
of the damage to its reputation. The abovementioned GTI represents a recent case 
of CSR campaigning designed specifically in reaction to a crisis, something which 
RUSAL has not done so far, but that needs nonetheless to be considered, as it can 
have a vital role in restoring a company’s damaged reputation [10]. Therefore, it is 
more accurate to say that the overall strategy takes two communication practices 
from the analysis of the experience of RUSAL, and integrates it with one taken from 
the case of Kaspersky, which responded to a crisis triggered by geopolitical motives 
with a CSR maneuver designed exactly for that. However, regardless of the type of 
crisis and how similar they might be, it should be reminded that a specific critical 
occurrence may pose its own specific communicational demands, and this, together 
with the company’s resources—that may in turn be different from the ones of com-
pany of the size of RUSAL—might make it more convenient to prioritize a certain 
measure over another, or to use measures that are not discussed in the composition. 
Hence, the paper does not intend and will not be the ultimate strategical framework 
for companies suffering due to on-state level geopolitical clashes, but it will shed 
light on how to react to a type of crisis that might be experienced by other corporate 
players in the future, and on the communication practices that were used in that 
regard in the recent case of RUSAL and Kaspersky, too.
It was previously said that RUSAL represents one of the biggest companies in the 
metal and mining industry globally. As a matter of fact, the company, which was 
founded back in 2000 following a merger with SUAL (the Siberian-Urals Aluminum 
Company) and Glencore (a multinational commodity trading and mining company 
headquartered in Switzerland), became the aluminum industry leader in 2007. 
Although the throne of leader in terms of aluminum production was seized by 
the Chinese Hongqiao Group in 2015, RUSAL remains a vital player, as it has more 
than 62,000 employees globally and a number of facilities across 5 continents and 
19 countries [2]. The man behind the consolidation of RUSAL’s position in the 
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global aluminum industry is the well-known Russian businessman and tycoon 
Oleg Deripaska, whose first moves in entrepreneurship were in the metal market. 
Following his involvement in the metal market, Deripaska then decided to expand 
his activities and founded En+ Group in 2006. En+ Group includes a number of 
companies from different industrial spheres, such as the energy and machinery 
ones. Consequently, Deripaska’s predominance in both the organizational structure 
and the shares of these companies is obvious, as he holds approximately 70% [7] 
of the shares of En+ Group of which he is founder and president. Alongside this, 
he has a controlling stake in RUSAL. However, some consider Deripaska to be a 
controversial figure: if, on the one hand, he is known for his business activities 
and philanthropy initiatives—e.g., Volnoye Delo, which is Russia’s largest charity 
foundation, founded in 1998 [7]—on the other hand, he is known for having always 
been in close contact with some of the most important officials of the Kremlin—
e.g., Vladimir Putin, or Polina Yumasheva, the ex-wife and step-granddaughter of 
former Russian President Boris Yeltsin, and daughter of Valentin Yumashev, one of 
Yeltsin’s close advisors.
Although the extent of the effective closeness of Deripaska to the Kremlin as 
well as the real influence of the Russian government inner circles on his actions 
cannot be determined, Deripaska and a number of other Russian oligarchs were 
accused of behaving on behalf of their government by OFAC. More precisely, 
Treasury Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin accused the Russian government for operat-
ing in favor of oligarchs and political elites, as well as for being engaged in “a range 
of malign activity around the globe, including continuing to occupy Crimea and 
instigate violence in eastern Ukraine, supplying the Assad regime with material and 
weaponry as they bomb their own civilians, attempting to subvert Western democ-
racies, and malicious cyber activities”[7].
Thus, as oligarchs have always been profiting from such corrupt system, on April 
6, 2018, economic restrictions against them were imposed. In this regard, Deripaska 
was designated “for having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or 
indirectly, a senior official of the Government of the Russian Federation, as well as 
pursuant to E.O. 13662 for operating in the energy 1 sector of the Russian Federation 
economy. Deripaska has said that he does not separate himself from the Russian 
state. He has also acknowledged possessing a Russian diplomatic passport, and 
claimed to have represented the Russian government in other countries. Deripaska 
has been investigated for money laundering and has been accused of threatening 
the lives of business rivals, illegally wiretapping a government official, and taking 
part in extortion and racketeering. There are also allegations that Deripaska bribed 
a government official, ordered the murder of a businessman, and had links to a 
Russian organized crime group”[6].
At that time, Deripaska owned a controlling share of En+ Group which, in turn, 
was controlling RUSAL, and this was enough of a motivation for the U.S. Treasury 
to put economic penalties on Deripaska’s companies. While there was no comment 
from RUSAL, the En+ Group announced changes in the structure of the organiza-
tion following designation on April 9, 2018, and that the company intended “to 
continue to fulfill its existing commitments whilst seeking solutions (which may 
involve adjustments to its existing agreements and arrangements in accordance with 
legal and regulatory requirements) to address the impact of the OFAC Sanctions” 
[6], although sanctions were expected to be “materially adverse to the business and 
prospects of the Group” [2]. Immediately after the Treasury’s decision in April, the 
price of aluminum soared above $ 2500 a ton [7]. In order to prevent the situation 
from further worsening, OFAC opted for watering down sanctions on En+ and 
RUSAL. Also, Mnuchin declared that RUSAL “felt the impact of U.S. sanctions 
because of its entanglement with Oleg Deripaska” [7] and that the Department 
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of the Treasury did not mean to target the “hardworking people who depend on 
RUSAL and its subsidiaries” [2].
Moreover, Mnuchin added that RUSAL had immediately approached the U.S. 
treasury with a petition for delisting, and that given the collateral damage on U.S. 
partners and allies due to these sanctions, the issue of General Licenses extending 
the maintenance of the wind-down period would be considered. To sum up, it is 
clear that RUSAL was being penalized due to its connection with En+ Group. As 
highlighted by Mnuchin himself, the measures taken by the Treasury were not only 
affecting Deripaska’s companies, but a number of U.S. political and commercial 
allies as well. When presenting RUSAL, it was mentioned that because of its size and 
number of production facilities around the world its importance could not be con-
fined to the Russian Federation. In fact, the importance of RUSAL increases even 
more when talking about aluminum output, as the company alone prior sanctions 
was covering about 20% of the aluminum demand in Europe, and was “responsible 
for 7% of global aluminum production” [6]. Hence, as reported by Reuters, it is 
logical that the situation put into alarm a number of European countries from the 
very beginning, as economic restrictions led to the previously mentioned shock 
in the price of aluminum, which in turn resulted from the fact that RUSAL, after 
being imposed to sanctions, could not produce aluminum at its full capacity; this 
would lead to severe repercussions for the global aluminum supply-chain and, 
consequently, to all the European manufactory industries whose production relies 
upon RUSAL. Therefore, the U.S. treasury directive from April 23 to diminish the 
gravity of sanctions on RUSAL was dictated—or at least influenced—by the interest 
that many countries had in minimizing any disruption in material supplies, and in 
avoiding any repercussion on their aluminum-liaised industries.
Officials from countries such as France, Germany, Ireland, and Italy—coun-
tries in which are RUSAL facilities, or interest in its aluminum provision—were 
among the first calling for a mitigation of the restrictions. Even some competitors 
of RUSAL, such as the Anglo-Australian multinational corporation Rio Tinto, 
advocated for a change in the initial measures, as “a squeeze on the largest producer 
of aluminum outside China would hit businesses around the world, disrupting 
production of myriad goods from car and planes to cans and foil, and putting jobs 
at risk” [10]. So, having understood the gravity of the situation, OFAC issued the 
so-called General License 14, which “authorizes U.S. persons to engage in speci-
fied transactions related to winding-down or maintaining business with United 
Company RUSAL PLC (RUSAL) and its subsidiaries until October 23, 2018 OFAC 
will not impose secondary sanctions on non-U.S. persons for engaging in the same 
activity involving RUSAL or its subsidiaries that General License 14 authorizes U.S. 
persons to engage in” [2].
In fact, measures similar to General License 14—General License 12 and General 
License 13—to minimize disruption to U.S. persons, partners, and allies had been 
already disposed from the beginning. However, as they proved to be not enough, the 
General License 14 was also issued. On 27 April 2018, En+ Group had announced 
that the day before they had submitted a formal request to OFAC to postpone the 
deadline of both General Licenses 12 and 13 from the initial set date (May 7, 2018), 
adding that “without an extension of the authorization period for General License 
No. 13, the ability of the Company to maintain its GDR listing on the London Stock 
Exchange will be materially impacted.” What is more important here, though, is 
that En+ made it known that following negotiations, Oleg Deripaska agreed in 
principle to reduce his shareholding in the Company to below 50%. Moreover, he 
agreed to later resign from the Board and “consent to the appointment of certain 
new Directors such that the Board will comprise a majority of new independent 
directors.”
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On May 2, En+ informed its publics that OFAC announced on May 1 an exten-
sion of the authorization period under a new General License 13, which would last 
until June 6, 2018. If the issue of General License 14 was mainly to be attributed 
to the pressure exerted on the U.S. Treasury by a number of interested parties, 
whose normal business activity was being threatened by sanctions on En+ and 
RUSAL, the extension of General License 13, instead, resulted from the efforts of 
En+ under the so-called “Barker Plan,” which Lord Gregory Barker of Battle—the 
current executive chairman of the company—started precisely on April 27, as he 
convinced Deripaska give up the 70% of En+ he then possessed. In a statement 
from June 6, 2018, by the French and the Jamaican governments to the U.S. FARA 
Unit in support of the “Barker Plan,” it was stated that by that time Lord Barker and 
En+ had already implemented the first two steps of the plan—to reduce Deripaska’s 
ownership stake in En+ below 70 % and to remove him from the Boards of both En+ 
and RUSAL.
The last component to replace Deripaska’s allies on the Boards by independent 
directors was the only one remaining. In this regard, on June 27, En+ announced the 
resignation of several members of the Board of Directors of the company. These 
changes were all made within the framework of the “Barker Plan.” Moreover, it was 
stated that the new members of the Board (being selected to ensure the efficient 
functioning of the corporate governance structure) would be replaced after lift-
ing the sanctions, as previously established with OFAC [10]. As the last step of the 
“Barker Plan” was completed, OFAC announced on September 21 that En+ and 
RUSAL approached the U.S. “about substantial corporate governance changes that 
could potentially result in significant changes in control,” and that to review the 
situation all the previous wind-down licenses would be extended until November 
12. Following this, a number of further extensions of the General Licenses expira-
tion dates were declared.
Finally, on December 19, 2018, the U.S. Department of the Treasury sent a 
notification to the Congress about its intention to terminate sanctions imposed on 
En+ and RUSAL within 30 days, as it was determined that “the significant restruc-
turing and corporate governance changes will enable them to meet the criteria for 
delisting.” On December 26, RUSAL announced the resignation of Matthias Warnig, 
the company’s Chairman of the Board of Directors. As expressed by Warnig’s 
words, with the planned delisting of the company from OFAC sanctions blacklist, 
his resignation was the natural last step to start a new strategic development for 
RUSAL. At this point, the last obstacle to sanctions removal was raised by the 
Democratic Party.
As a matter of fact, after OFAC notified the U.S. Congress about its intent to 
terminate sanctions against Deripaska-linked companies, Democrats submitted a 
bill to the U.S. Senate to repeal such measure as they viewed it as another directive 
pro-Russian/pro-oligarch from the Trump administration [11]. In spite of the fact 
that they were joined by eleven Republicans, Democrats fell short in the vote, as 
only 57 senators voted in favor of prolonging sanctions enforcement, and at least 60 
votes were required to approve the bill. At last, on January 27, 2019, the official del-
isting of En+ and RUSAL from the OFAC sanctions list was declared. As stated the 
next day by En+, the removal from the OFAC list was reached upon the completion 
of the “Barker Plan,” together with some other conditions such as auditing, report-
ing, and certifications by both En+ and RUSAL to OFAC, in order to prove further 
compliance with the delisting norms. In this regard, Lord Barker of Battle added 
that “the strong support for this plan from both the European Union and the British 
government, and a coalition of nations from Sweden to Jamaica, further underpins 
the broad based international support for the actions of the U.S. Administration 
to lift sanctions. With two thirds of the Board now are controlled by independent 
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directors and nearly two thirds of the company shares now are controlled by 
minority shareholders & independent U.S. Trustees, there has been a fundamen-
tal shift in both governance and ownership.” The ad personam restrictions on 
Oleg Deripaska—whose direct interest in En+ was brought below 44.95%—are 
instead continued in force at present day—April 23, 2019. On March 15, 2019, the 
Russian oligarch filed a lawsuit in the district court of Washington D.C. against 
the U.S. Treasury and Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin, as sanctions left him “totally 
isolated” and excluded from both the American and Russian financial systems.
It was established that the term “crisis” refers to a number of different events 
and occurrences. A common factor of most crises is their potential to disrupt an 
organization’s operations, while also posing both a financial and reputational threat. 
In this chapter, it was decided to put emphasis on the reputational component, as 
reputational damage can be viewed as the factor capable of bringing together crises 
of diverse nature. As highlighted by Coombs [1], during any crisis an organiza-
tion’s reputation suffers and the normal level of reputation that it enjoys among 
stakeholders goes down. On top of this, a call for action on part of the managers of 
the company is needed. In crisis contexts, one of the most important functions is 
crisis communication, a branch of strategic communication which deals with the 
use of words and actions to manage information and meaning during crisis process 
in order to prevent and limit the damage that can be caused [12]. Given that every 
crisis arises due to individual circumstance, no crisis is the same. Therefore, a 
communication strategy which can answer communication demands presented by 
diverse and specific crisis situations would represent the ideal solution. However, 
precisely because of the multitude of facets a crisis can present and the great number 
of variables that—as the En+/RUSAL case showed—might be needed to be taken 
into consideration, the use of terms such as “best-practice” will be avoided. Having 
clarified this, one of the best routes that companies under crisis circumstances can 
pursue is provided by the evidence-based situational crisis communication theory 
(SCCT), developed by Coombs in 2007, which suggests that crisis managers should 
mould strategic crisis responses on the basis of the particular threat posed by the 
particular crisis [1]. The relevance that the Coombs model enjoys in the field of crisis 
communication derives precisely from its ductility and wide applicability, which is 
also why it was ultimately decided to use it as main component for the first building 
block of the communications strategy discussed in the paper. The main idea of SCCT 
is that a crisis, regardless of its gravity—and no matter how well it is handled—is 
a negative event nonetheless. During critical occurrences, the stakeholders of the 
company try to make sense of the situation, and they do so through the so-called 
attribution theory. This theory claims that people tend to search for the causes of 
the events, especially when those are as negative and potentially harmful as crises 
[3]. Essentially, the people of the organization will experience certain emotions in 
reaction to the event, and such emotions, together with the attributions of respon-
sibility, are to be the determiners and the “prescribers” for managers about how to 
handle information and respond to the crisis. In other words, if the crisis is the result 
of some situational factors—factors whose control goes beyond the responsibility of 
the organization—then the emotions of the interested publics are likely to be not as 
negative as the ones of the stakeholders of a company that is deemed to be the main 
responsible for the outburst of the crisis. Thus, while in the first case—as the orga-
nization is not considered responsible—stakeholders’ emotions will be relatively ok, 
in the second case, stakeholders will be likely to be angry and this will cause further 
reputational damage to the company. SCCT suggests that by understanding the 
situation and the probable reactions from the publics, crisis managers can determine 
which crisis communication strategies will maximize reputational protection. 
Therefore, first of all, crisis managers need to assess the level of the reputational 
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threat that the crisis presents. To do so, three factors need to be taken into account: 
initial crisis responsibility, crisis history, and prior relational reputation.
Initial crisis responsibility traces back to what has been told in the previous 
passage—i.e., the assumption that stakeholders try to understand the degree of 
involvement that the organization has in the outbreak of a crisis, and to what extent 
stakeholders believe organizational actions caused the crisis. It goes unsaid that if 
the attribution of responsibility on the organization goes higher, the reputational 
threat will increase. More specifically, in the context of SCCT theory, three crisis 
clusters—which are in turn related to certain types of crisis—have been identified. 
In the first cluster—known as victim cluster—there is a very weak attribution of 
crisis responsibility; in fact, the company is observed as a victim of the occur-
rence. Usually, natural disasters, rumor, and workplace violence are categorized 
as such crises. The second cluster, instead, is defined as and characterized by a 
minimal attribution of crisis responsibility. The crisis event is here considered as 
unintentional or uncontrollable by the organization—e.g., technical-error accident, 
technical-error product. Finally, the intentional cluster, which views a strong 
attribution of the event on the organization—e.g., human-error accident, organiza-
tional misdeed. A list with some examples of crisis grouped by crisis clusters can be 
arranged as follows:
Victim cluster (the organization is also a victim of the crisis; weak attributions 
of crisis responsibility and mild reputational threat):
• natural disaster—acts of nature damage an organization such as an earthquake;
• rumor—false and damaging information about an organization is being 
circulated;
• workplace violence—current or former employee attacks current employees 
onsite; and
• product tampering/malevolence—external agent causes damage to an 
organization.
Accidental cluster (the organizational actions leading to the crisis were unin-
tentional; minimal attributions of crisis responsibility and moderate reputational 
threat):
• challenges—stakeholders claim an organization is operating in an inappropri-
ate manner;
• technical-error accidents—a technology or equipment failure causes an indus-
trial accident; and
• technical-error product harm—a technology or equipment failure causes a 
product to be recalled.
Preventable cluster (the organization knowingly placed people at risk, took 
inappropriate actions or violated a law/regulation; strong attributions of crisis 
responsibility and severe reputational threat):
• human-error accidents—human error causes an industrial accident;
• human-error product harm—human error causes a product to be recalled;
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• organizational misdeed with no injuries—stakeholders are deceived without 
injury;
• organizational misdeed management misconduct—laws or regulations are 
violated by management; and
• organizational misdeed with injuries, stakeholders are placed at risk by man-
agement and injuries occur.
The second factor—crisis history—concerns whether the organization has 
previously experienced crises of similar nature. In this sense, the attribution theory 
suggests that when an organization undergoes crises of a similar nature on multiple 
occasions, then it must have some ongoing problems that need to be addressed. If 
these issues are not addressed, then there could be negative repercussions when 
considering the third factor, prior relational reputation. Prior relational reputation 
consists of how well or poorly an organization is perceived to have treated its stake-
holders before. Both the last two elements can work as intensifiers for the degree 
of initial crisis responsibility: if the company has a bad history, then the company 
will be likely to be attributed more responsibility for the crisis. As previously stated, 
these three interconnected elements become of use to crisis managers in assessing 
the reputational threat that a crisis can pose to the company. Here, the three factors 
are combined in a process of assessment consisting of two phases.
Firstly, managers try to determine the type of crisis that their company ended 
up in; according to SCCT, each crisis type generates specific and predictable levels 
of crisis responsibility. By identifying the crisis type, managers will be able to 
anticipate the extent to which stakeholders initially hold the company responsible 
for the outbreak of the crisis. Secondly, crisis history and prior relationship reputa-
tion—the two intensifying factors of initial crisis responsibility—are considered, 
as they can alter the initial reputational threat: greater crisis responsibility will 
be attributed to the company that already experienced analogous occurrences in 
the past, while the company whose reputation has never been tarnished similarly 
before will not suffer as much. It was affirmed by Coombs [1] that the reputational 
threat deriving from an accidental crisis can escalate into the degree of intentional 
crisis when similar preconditions are there, as they can trigger stronger feelings of 
hatred toward the company. After identifying the reputational threat, managers 
must create their own crisis response strategies. As reiterated on several occasions 
earlier in the composition, even for the major experts of the field, it is incon-
ceivable to craft a list of response strategies that can be referred to in any crisis 
situation. In this sense, SCCT presented a groundbreaking approach to crisis com-
munications, as it made crystal clear that there should be a theoretical link between 
the type of the crisis and the response strategies adopted to put the fire out. For 
example, the response needs to be dictated by the degree of responsibility which 
the company is attributed during a crisis; still, as response strategies are pivoted on 
the organization’s perceived acceptance of responsibility for the crisis, managers 
need to be extremely careful, as resorting to inappropriate responses may lead to 
worsened reputational damage. The more accommodative response strategies—
e.g., to show greater concern for the victims—can lead stakeholders to believe that 
the organization is taking on the responsibility for the whole matter. Additionally, 
SCCT suggests that response strategies can be grouped into three different typolo-
gies on the basis of the organization’s perceived acceptance of responsibility for 
the crisis—e.g., denial, diminish, and rebuild. A list of SCCT crisis response 
strategies will now be presented, following which some insights about them will be 
discussed.
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Deny crisis response strategies are:
• attack the accuser—crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming 
something is wrong with the organization;
• denial—crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis; and
• scapegoat—crisis manager blames some person or group for the crisis.
Diminish crisis response strategies are:
• excuse—crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying 
intent to do harm and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered 
the crisis; and
• justification—crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the 
crisis.
Rebuild crisis response strategies are:
• compensation—crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victims; and
• apology—crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for 
the crisis and asks stakeholders for forgiveness.
Bolstering crisis response strategies are:
• reminder—crisis manager tells stakeholders about the past good works of the 
organization;
• ingratiation—crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past 
good works by the organization; and
• victimage—crisis manager reminds stakeholders that the organization is a 
victim of the crisis too.
Deny crisis strategies seek to disconnect the organization from the crisis, as if 
it is not involved, it is unlikely to suffer from it. Still, in some types of crisis, such 
as rumor and challenge, managers are called to argue that there is no real crisis. If 
stakeholders embrace the version of crisis managers, then the organization is spared 
any reputational damage.
Diminish crisis strategies instead attempt to prove that a crisis is not as bad as 
stakeholders believe, or that organizational mismanagement was not among the 
underlying causes. If managers succeed in diminishing the involvement of the 
organization in the outbreak of the crisis—i.e., they lead stakeholders to believe that 
responsibility is not on the company—then the harmful effects are reduced. In order 
to achieve this, solid evidence is required as stakeholders will be given a number of 
frames—or versions—differing from the organization, from which they will select 
the one that they find as more plausible.
Such strategies are mostly used to mitigate the damages of crises constituting 
serious reputational threats, i.e., intentional crises, or crises that are of a similar 
nature to previous ones. Similar to rebuild strategies are bolstering response 
strategies, which are used to develop the organization’s reputational asset, although 
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only to a minor extent. Bolstering strategies base more upon the past relationships 
between the company and its stakeholders; for instance, the bolstering strategy 
“reminder” draws on back past good deeds in order to counterbalance the adverse 
effects from the present crisis. Essentially, bolstering functions as an additional 
strategy in order to support the aforementioned strategies. It was determined 
that communications can affect perceptions and change the way people think 
of the organization. If, on the one hand, the deny strategy turns out to be of use 
exclusively if stakeholders are convinced that there is no crisis, on the other hand, 
adjusting information, e.g., to express concern for the victims, and rebuilding the 
strategy find more ground for application and are the most effective ways to lessen 
the damage resulting from reputational threats.
Considering how well they address victims, rebuild strategies may be seen as the 
most logical response to crisis. However, they are not always the optimal solution for a 
number of reasons. First of all, it was demonstrated that they are usually more expen-
sive. Secondly, overly accommodative strategies bring no greater reputational benefits; 
in fact, they can actually worsen the situation as stakeholders may be led to believe 
that the company is even more involved in the crisis than what was originally thought. 
To sum up, a list of crisis response strategies recommendations will be now presented:
• informing and adjusting information alone can be enough when crises have 
minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises), no history of 
similar crises and a neutral or positive prior relationship reputation;
• victimage can be used as part of the response for workplace violence, product 
tampering, natural disasters, and rumors;
• diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with minimal 
attributions of crisis responsibility (victim crises) coupled with a history of 
similar crises and/or negative prior relationship reputation;
• diminish crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attribu-
tions of crisis responsibility (accident crises), which have no history of similar 
crises, and a neutral or positive prior relationship reputation;
• rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with low attributions 
of crisis responsibility (accident crises), coupled with a history of similar crises 
and/or negative prior relationship reputation;
• rebuild crisis response strategies should be used for crises with strong attribu-
tions of crisis responsibility (preventable crises) regardless of crisis history or 
prior relationship reputation;
• the deny posture crisis response strategies should be used for rumor and chal-
lenge crises, when possible; and
• maintaining consistency in crisis response strategies.
Mixing deny crisis response strategies with either diminish or rebuild strate-
gies will erode the effectiveness of the overall response. In spite of the fact that 
the whole theory bases on the specific crisis event, some limitations in the crisis 
response strategies provided by SCCT exist. In this sense, financial resources are 
the dominant constraints as some companies might not be able to afford or finance 
a particular crisis response, having then to resort to a less preferred strategy. Yet, 
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SCCT is among the best frameworks that managers have at their disposal to protect 
corporate reputation at crisis times, and this is due to the fact that it originates from 
and incorporates the psychology of the stakeholders.
Overall, crisis type, crisis history, and prior relationship reputation help under-
standing how stakeholders will react to the crisis situation. Managers will be able to 
draw upon from that, and outline recommendations that best fit the particular crisis 
context. To give an example, some elements belonging to the SCCT framework will 
now be applied to the case of En+/RUSAL. In the first press announcement after 
the inclusion of RUSAL in OFAC list, En+ [7] reported that it was searching for a 
solution, while fulfilling its existing commitments. Then, as it was seen, pressure 
from several U.S. economic partners and allies following the increased price of 
aluminum spurred OFAC into extending the sanctions relief General Licenses on 
En+/RUSAL. In addition, OFAC reaffirmed the reason which first led to sanctions 
imposition—i.e., Deripaska’s influence over En+. Although this was known from 
the beginning, it was now even more obvious that the best way for En+ to have 
sanctions lifted might be to remove Deripaska from the organizational structure. 
Therefore, OFAC declarations not only led to the initiation of the “Barker Plan”—
aimed at forcing Deripaska out of his seat as majority shareholder of the Board—
but also hinted the preferable crisis communication strategy for the particular 
situation—i.e., scapegoating. In the second press release from April 27, En+ [7] let 
stakeholders know that Deripaska agreed in principle to the conditions dictated 
by OFAC, and this became the leitmotif of En+ crisis communication; indeed, in 
all the following press releases, it was always made clear that efforts to reduce the 
relevance of Oleg Deripaska—i.e., the expedient used by OFAC to justify sanctions 
imposition—were being carried out. It is, however, curious that the choice of the 
scapegoat here did not come in response to the stakeholders’ attribution of the 
situation, but was suggested by the opposing party itself. To conclude, the fact that 
Deripaska [7] commented the accusations moved against him only after sanctions 
were lifted suggests that he might have been instructed to do so, otherwise his crisis 
communication approach might have hindered En+’s, making it harder to have 
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